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ABSTRACT: 
This Comment explores several interesting legal questions regarding the proper interpretation 
42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting, when 
discrimination arises in the context of a consumer retail contract. It explores how the Fifth 
Circuit’s and other federal courts’ narrow interpretation of section 1981’s application in a retail 
setting, which allows plaintiffs to invoke the statute only when they have been prevented from 
completing their purchase,  is contrary to the statute’s express language, Congressional intent, 
and to evolving concepts of contract theory, all of which encompass our society’s deep 
commitment to combating racial discrimination through strict enforcement of civil rights 
protections.  It examines the legislative and interpretive history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
emphasizing the trend in both Congress and the courts to interpret this and other civil rights laws 
broadly.  
 It then reviews a selection of federal court interpretations of § 1981’s application to the retail 
setting, from the very restrictive to those that have found a workable, broader interpretation that 
encompasses the various stages of the retailer-consumer contractual relationship.  It highlights 
the standard adopted in the Sixth Circuit that finds actionable “markedly hostile” discriminatory 
conduct affecting the contractual relationship.  Finally, the Comment examines how, as contract 
theory itself evolves to encompass a more expansive view of responsibility and liability between 
contracting parties, so should the non-discrimination statute which governs contractual relations.  
In conclusion, an adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s “markedly hostile” test is urged. 




I. Introduction                 3 
II. Legislative and Interpretive History of Section 1981            6  
III. Section 1981’s Application to Consumer Discrimination:  Discrepancies 
in Interpretation Among Federal Courts            19 
 
A. Courts Narrowly Interpreting Section 1981            21 
B. Moving Toward an Expanded Vision of Section 1981 Protections in the 
Commercial Context               28 
 
IV.   Some Interpretive Guidance from Common Law Contract Theory       39 
V.  Conclusion                46 
 




On March 26, 1995, Denise Arguello and her family stopped at a Conoco gas station in  
Forth Worth, Texas on their way to a family picnic.1 She approached the counter with her items 
and attempted to pay for them with a credit card.  The sales clerk, Cindy Smith, was instantly 
rude.2 She requested Ms. Arguello’s identification, and when Ms. Arguello provided her out of 
state driver’s license, Ms. Smith stated that it was Conoco policy not to accept out of state 
licenses as valid forms of identification.3 An argument ensued, after which Ms. Smith accepted 
the credit card and completed the transaction.4
After Ms. Arguello paid for her purchase, the tension between Ms. Smith and Ms. 
Arguello escalated into an altercation, during which Ms. Smith called Ms. Arguello a “f**king 
Iranian Mexican bitch.”5 After Ms. Arguello exited the store, Ms. Smith continued her verbal 
assault on Ms. Arguello by screaming racial epithets on the gas station’s intercom, which 
broadcast in the store’s parking lot.  She also laughed at and made several crude gestures toward 
Ms. Arguello and her family, who was waiting in the car.6




5 Id. (Ms. Arguello is Hispanic). 
6 Id. 
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Ms. Arguello brought a 42 U.S.C. § 19817 claim against Conoco, alleging that the 
discriminatory and abusive treatment that she received during this encounter deprived her of the 
right to contract on the same terms as white customers, in violation of  § 1981.8 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Ms. Arguello did not have a cognizable section 1981 claim 
because she was not prevented from making her purchases, despite the “offensive” and 
“egregious” conduct to which she was subjected.9 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Ms. 
Arguello’s petition for writ of certiorari.10 
Ms. Arguello’s case presents several interesting legal questions regarding the proper 
interpretation of a Reconstruction era civil rights statute that is of vital importance to this 
country’s civil rights jurisprudence. This Comment explores how the Fifth Circuit’s and other 
 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (“(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons 
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. (b) For purposes of this 
section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, 
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions 
of the contractual relationship.”). 
8 Arguello, 2001 WL 1442340, at *2.  Ms. Arguello’s father, Mr. Govea, who was in the store at 
the time of this incident, also brought an unsuccessful section 1981 claim as part of the same 
suit. Id.  This Comment will explore only the merits of Ms. Arguello’s claim.   
9 Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2003). 
10 Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 540 U.S. 1035 (Nov 17, 2003) (NO. 03-342). 
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federal courts’ narrow interpretation of section 1981’s application in a retail setting, which 
allows plaintiffs to invoke the statute only when they have been prevented from completing their 
purchase,  is contrary to the statute’s express language, Congressional intent, and to evolving 
concepts of contract theory, all of which encompass our society’s deep commitment to 
combating racial discrimination through strict enforcement of civil rights protections.  Part II of 
this Comment examines the legislative and interpretive history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, emphasizing 
the trend in both Congress and the courts to interpret this and other civil rights laws broadly.  
Part III reviews a selection of federal court interpretations of § 1981’s application to the retail 
setting.  Part III(A) considers several district and circuit court cases, such as Arguello, which 
have adopted a narrow and restrictive interpretation of section 1981.  Part III(B) reviews 
decisions that have found a workable, broader interpretation that encompasses the various stages 
of the retailer-consumer contractual relationship, and highlights the standard adopted in the Sixth 
Circuit that finds actionable “markedly hostile” discriminatory conduct affecting the contractual 
relationship.  Part IV examines how, as contract theory itself evolves to encompass a more 
expansive view of responsibility and liability between contracting parties, so should the non-
discrimination statute which governs contractual relations.  Part V concludes with general 
recommendations to the courts on how best to incorporate the language and intent of section 
1981 in a retail setting, specifically encouraging universal adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s 
“markedly hostile” test. 
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II. Legislative and Interpretive History of Section 1981 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was passed in 1865 to abolish the  
institution of slavery.11 It states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to its jurisdiction.  Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.”12 In response to the end of the Civil War and the ratification 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, many Southern states passed laws that became known as the 
Black Codes.  The purpose of the Black Codes was to deprive freed slaves of many of the 
promises of their newly granted freedom.13 In reviewing the history preceding the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in the Slaughter House Cases, observed that the 
Black Codes, along with other extra-legal methods of discrimination, “saddled Negroes with 
onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights . . . to such an extent that their 
freedom was of little value.”14 
The Slaughter House Cases brought before the Supreme Court the question of whether 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the state of Louisiana from creating a state-
sanctioned monopoly in the slaughter house business in New Orleans.15 The Court reasoned that 
Louisiana’s conduct, however unwise, was not unconstitutional because the intent of the 
 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.   
12 Id. 
13 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426 (1968) (reviewing the history of the times 
preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). See also discussion infra pp. XX 
14 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872).    
15 Id. at 49.   
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments was primarily to abolish the institution of slavery and its 
legacy, not to render unconstitutional legislative efforts to regulate economic activity.16 In 
tracing the history and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court discussed the practical 
effect of the Black Codes, recalling that in some states former slaves were forbidden to enter 
town unless as menial servants.17 They were required to live and work on land that they were 
not allowed to buy; only certain occupations were available for former slaves to enter; and they 
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case where a white man was a party.18 
It was said that “their lives were at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their 
protection were insufficient or were not enforced.”19 Thus, the Slaughter-House Cases clarified 
that the purposes of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments was essentially to 
combat slavery’s legacy of discrimination, such as that embedded in the Black Codes. 
In the same year Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment,20 it also passed the Civil  
Rights Act of 1866, also in an effort to combat the Black Codes and other laws and practices 
limiting the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.21 The 1866 Act was passed 
pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to pass laws to enforce the 
 
16 Id. at 72.   
17 Id. at 70.   
18 Id.
19 Id. 
20 The Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1866, though not ratified until 1868.  
U.S. CONST. Am. XIV (historical notes). 
21 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1809, 1861.  See also Jones, 392 U.S. at 422-436.   
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abolition of the institution of slavery.22 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified in 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1982, granted all citizens “the same right . . .  to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”23 The Act’s overarching purpose was to give 
“real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.”24 The lofty aspirations 
of the 1866 Act, however, were soon grounded by the Supreme Court.   
In 1883, the Supreme Court heard a conglomeration of appeals known as The Civil Rights 
Cases.25 The Civil Rights Cases challenged the constitutionality of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, 
which forbade discrimination in places of public accommodation and provided criminal penalties 
for those who denied to persons of color “the full enjoyment of any accommodations” covered 
by the section.26 The Supreme Court decided in the Civil Rights Cases, even after conceding that 
the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the “power to pass all laws 
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery,” that a refusal to 
accommodate or to enter into a contract with another person because of their race could not “be 
 
22 Jones, 392 U.S. at 433. 
23 The original section 1 of the 1866 Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (2000).  
Excerpted in Jones, 392 U.S. at 422.  
24 Jones, 322 U.S. at 433.   
25 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
26 Id. at 9 (citing Act Cong. March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335). 
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justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant . . . .”27 The 
Court continued:   
an act of refusal [to accommodate] has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary 
servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be 
sought under the laws of the state . . . It would be running the slavery argument 
into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person 
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will 
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in 
other matters of intercourse or business.28 
The Court distinguished between what it deemed were the prohibitions of state interference with 
“fundamental rights” in the 1866 Act, of which it approved, and the 1875 Act’s attempt to 
regulate “social rights” and private interactions between individual citizens, which it found 
unacceptable.29 In conclusion, the Court asserted that because Congress had attempted to 
regulate such “social rights” with the 1875 Civil Rights Act, it had exceeded its authority under 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and therefore found the 1875 Act unconstitutional.30 
As a result of the Civil Rights Cases, the 1875 Civil Rights Act was defunct, and the 1866 
Civil Rights Act, which also ostensibly prohibited racially-motivated refusals to contract or 
serve, was in many ways delegitimized.31 The Court had decided that such outright contract 
 
27 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 24.   
28 Id.
29 Id. at 25-28. 
30 Id. at 25. 
31 See e.g. Cynthia Gail Smith, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union:  New Limitations on an Old 
Civil Rights Statute, 68 N.C. L. REV. 799, 809-10 (April 1990). 
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discrimination was not illegal unless perpetrated by state law or custom.32 Individuals could 
refuse to contract with each other – the state was only required to enforce the contract once 
formed.33 This decision ushered in an era of restrictive reading of all civil rights laws, as well as 
of Congress’s ability under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to pass legislation aimed 
at eradicating “the badges and incidents” of slavery.34 Consequently, the goal of infusing of 
“real content” into the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, was severely and 
suddenly halted.35 Segregationist laws were instituted, allowable because they simply restricted 
the “social rights” of citizens,36 legally sanctioning second-class citizenship for minorities, and 
were not successfully challenged until over eighty years later.37 
32 Although the Court did not specify that its holding specifically affected the scope of the 1866, 
its discussions of the nature of the 1866 Act versus the nature of the 1875 Act indicated its intent 
clarify the reach of both enactments.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-25; see also Smith, 
supra note 31 at 809-810.  In addition, Justice Harlan, writing for the dissent, states that these 
“badges and incidents of slavery,” which the majority misconstrued, “lie at the very foundation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”  109 U.S. at 35.  Therefore there is little doubt that the 
restrictive holding in this case was equally applicable to the 1866 Act.   
33 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-17. 
34 See Smith, supra note 31, at 809-10. 
35 Id. 
36 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. 
37 See Smith, supra note 31, at 809-10. 
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The Supreme Court returned to the issue of the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s applicability to 
private conduct in 1968.38 Its decision in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. revisited the legislative 
history and intent of the 1866 Act and concluded that its prohibitions against discrimination 
should, in fact, be applied to private conduct.39 The African-American Plaintiffs in Jones had 
attempted to buy a home in a private subdivision in Missouri, and the Defendant had refused to 
sell to them solely because of their race.40 The Plaintiffs claimed their 42 U.S.C. § 1982 rights 
 
38 The Court had considered the provisions of the Act before in various cases.  See, e.g., Shelley 
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (both holding that section 
1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, 
though as privately enforced the covenants are constitutional); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 
U.S. 704 (1930) (Ordinance prohibiting use as residence of building in block occupied mainly by 
those with whom intermarriage is forbidden held invalid);  Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 
(1927) (municipal ordinance in New Orleans requiring racially segregated neighborhoods held 
unconstitutional and in violation of section 1981); and Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) 
(Municipal ordinance forbidding person from occupying house in a block upon which a greater 
number of houses are occupied by persons of the opposite race held invalid and in violation of 
section 1981). All of these cases arose in the context of state-sanctioned or mandated 
discrimination, not especially pertinent to our discussion here.  
39 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
40 Id. at 412.   
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had been violated.41 The Supreme Court acknowledged that when Congress passed the 1866 
Civil Rights Act, it did so on the basic assumption that “it was approving a comprehensive 
statute forbidding all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the 
Act.”42 The plain language of the statute forbids discrimination by not only “state or local law,” 
but also “custom or prejudice.”43 Therefore it was clear to the Jones Court that section 1 of the 
1866 Act “was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of those rights enumerated in 
the statute . . . ,”44 not just those embodied in the law.  The Court further found that Congress 
exercised proper power, granted to it by the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enabling Clause,45 in 
forbidding private acts of racial discrimination in the 1866 Act.46 
This decision was a direct reversal of the holding in the Civil Rights Cases, at least in 
terms of its applicability to the 1866 Act. While Jones specifically interpreted what is now 42 
 
41 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property.”). 
42 Jones, 392 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). 
43 See id. at 423-24. 
44 Id. at 426.  See Jones also for an extensive review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and its drafters’ intent that its provisions apply to private conduct.  Id. at 421-37. 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. (“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
46 Jones, 392 U.S. at 426. 
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U.S.C § 1982, the provision granting equal property rights to all citizens,47 its legislative intent 
and history have been held to be identical to that of 42 U.S.C § 1981, its sister statute.48 After 
the Court thus clarified that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did apply to private acts of 
discrimination, plaintiffs began to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to remedy racially discriminatory 
employment practices.  
 
47 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property.”). 
48 See e.g. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431,  439-440 (1973) 
(“The operative language of both s. 1981 and s. 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866, . 
31, s 1, 14 Stat. 27. In light of the historical interrelationship between s. 1981 and s. 1982, we see 
no reason to construe these sections differently when applied, on these facts . . .”); Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) (stating that the holding in Jones “necessarily implied that 
the portion of s. 1 of the 1866 Act present codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 likewise reaches purely 
private acts of racial discrimination. . .  The statutory holding in Jones was that the ‘(1866) Act 
was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or 
not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerate therein,’ . . . One of the ‘rights 
enumerated’ in section 1 is ‘the same right  . . .  to make and enforce contracts . . .’”) ( internal 
citations omitted);  Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 676 (1987) (“Both §§ 1981 and 
1982 were derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866;  their wording and their identical 
legislative history have led the Court to construe them similarly.”).  
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In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that section 1981 affords a federal 
remedy against racial discrimination in private employment.49 Additionally, it held that a private 
school’s denial of admission to prospective students on the basis of their race was also a form of 
illegal contract discrimination, proscribed by section 1981.50 These and other cases during the 
1970s and 80s affirmed that section 1981’s protections reached various private acts of 
discrimination, including those in a private employment context.51 The Court would next be 
tasked with defining, within those contexts, what it meant to “make and enforce contracts.”  
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the Court attempted to define which rights were 
protected by section 1981’s prohibition against discrimination in the making and enforcement of 
contracts.52 In Goodman, at issue was which statute of limitations should apply to the plaintiffs’ 
section 1981 claim of racial discrimination in employment.53 The Court decided that states’ 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and not state statutes of limitations governing 
 
49 See e.g. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding an individual may 
bring claims of racial discrimination in employment under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
50 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
51 The Supreme Court also established that section 1981 applied to contract discrimination based 
on national origin discrimination (Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)), 
and to discrimination against white people, based on their race (McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)). 
52 482 U.S. 656 (1987). 
53 Id. 
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interference with contractual relations, should apply.54 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Marshall, strongly disagreed and emphasized in his dissent section 1981’s 
interrelation with contract rights.55 Explaining the scope of those contract rights, Justice 
Brennan stated:  
clearly, the ‘full and equal benefit’ and ‘punishment’ clauses guarantee numerous 
rights other than equal treatment in the execution, administration, and the 
enforcement of contracts.  In this sense, § 1981  . . . is broadly concerned with 
‘the equal status of every person.  But § 1981 was primarily intended, and has 
been most frequently utilized, to remedy injury to a narrower category of 
contractual or economic rights.’56 [It] is apparent that the primary thrust of the 
1866 Congress was the provision of equal rights and treatment in the matrix of 
contractual and quasi-contractual relationships that form the economic sphere.57 
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall, therefore, recognized that section 1981 
requires equal treatment for all citizens at all stages of economic transactions and 
contractual relationships.58 
The majority in Goodman also recognized section 1981’s broad scope, basing its 
conclusion that section 1981 claims were more properly classified as tort actions on a 
belief that tort claims encompassed the wider range of rights included in section 1981.59 
The majority described section 1981 as a protection of the “personal right to engage in 
 
54 Id. at 661-62. 
55 Id. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (applying an 
analogous analysis to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (emphasis in original)). 
57 Id. at 676 (emphasis added). 
58 Goodman, 482 U.S. at 669.   
59 Id. at 661. 
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economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory interference."60 It is 
noteworthy that the Court described the statute as creating the right to be free from 
interference with economic activity, and not strictly a prohibition of racially-motivated 
refusals to contract.   
 Following this series of decisions that incorporated an expanded view of the economic 
rights and activities protected by section 1981, in 1989, the Supreme Court retreated to a 
restrictive definition of the section’s use of the terms “make and enforce” contracts.61 In 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court was faced with a challenge to its 1976 decision in 
Runyon v. McCrary, which held that section 1981 prohibited racial discrimination in the making 
and enforcing of private contracts.62 The plaintiff in Patterson alleged that her employer, the 
McLean Credit Union, harassed her, failed to promote her and ultimately fired her because of her 
race, in violation of section 1981.63 The Court considered whether the petitioner’s claim of 
racial harassment in her employment was actionable under section 1981, and whether the Runyon 
interpretation of section 1981 should be overruled.64 
60 Id. 
61 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
62 Id.; Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (a private school’s denial of admission to prospective students on 
the basis of their race was also a form of illegal contract discrimination, proscribed by section 
1981).   
63 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 169. 
64 Id. at 170-71. 
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 After reargument and reconsideration, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Runyon that § 
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.65 It 
stated that “Runyon is entirely consistent with our society’s deep commitment to the eradication 
of discrimination based on a person’s race or the color of his or her skin.”66 However, despite 
the asserted commitment to combat racial discrimination, the Court further held that section 1981 
was not applicable to actions in which the actual “making” or “enforcing” of contracts was not 
impaired.67 It found that, in the employment context, “postformation” conduct of the employer 
affecting the terms of the contract, such as the “imposition of discriminatory working 
conditions,” does not involve “the right to make a contract . . . .”68 It further reasoned that the 
 
65 Id. at 171. 
66 Id. at 174.  The Court also cited many of its own proclamations which support this contention: 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (“Every pronouncement of this 
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit 
racial segregation and discrimination”); Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The law regards man as man, and 
takes no account of his ...  color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the 
land are involved").  Later in the opinion, the court states “The law now reflects society’s 
consensus that discrimination based on the color of one’s skin is a profound wrong of tragic 
dimension.  Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of 
retreat from Congress’s policy to forbid racial discrimination in the private, as well as the public, 
sphere.”  Id. at 188. 
67 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176. 
68 Id. at 177. 
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right to enforce a contract was only limited to “conduct by an employer which impairs an 
employee’s ability to enforce through legal process his or her established contract rights.”69 The 
petitioner’s claim of racial harassment, therefore, was held not to be actionable under section 
1981.70 
Congress responded to the Court’s narrow construction of one of the nation’s oldest and 
most important civil rights statutes with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.71 The 1991 Act 
specifically revised the wording of section 1981 to clarify that post-formation conduct in the 
employment context would be covered by section 1981.72 Congress added sections (b) and (c) to 
the provision, which now reads:  
 
(a) Statement of equal rights 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other. 
 
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined 
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the 
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship. 
 
(c) Protection against impairment 
 
69 Id. at 177-78. 
70 Id. at 178. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
72 Id. 
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The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by 
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.73 
Further, in the legislative history of the Act, Congress wrote:  “H.R. 1, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, has two primary purposes. The first is to respond to recent Supreme Court 
decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those 
decisions. The second is to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under 
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation 
for victims of discrimination.”74 The 1991 Act, therefore, was a swift and complete 
interment of the holding in Patterson v. McLean.
III. Section 1981’s Application to Consumer Discrimination:  Discrepancies 
in Interpretation Among Federal Courts 
 
Although the 1991 Act clarified that the “make and enforce” language of section 
1981 applied to post contract formation conduct in an employment setting,  the 
application of the statute’s new language to consumer contract formations was less clear.   
Consequently, courts are struggling with its proper interpretation.  The courts are 
wrestling with how exactly to define the parameters of the contractual relationship that 
exists between a commercial establishment and its customers.  Perhaps fearful of creating 
a generalized cause of action for all instances of racial discrimination occurring anywhere 
near a retail establishment, many courts have erred on the side of extreme caution.75 
73 Id. 
74 H.R. Rep. No. 40 (II), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991. 
75 See discussion infra, s. III (A). 
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These courts find that as long as the actual ability to purchase (and therefore complete the 
contract) has not been prevented, section 1981 rights are not implicated.76 
Unfortunately, the subtleties of today’s manifestations of racial discrimination 
escape their model, as does redress for millions of American consumers who are 
followed, harassed, verbally and physically assaulted, or simply required to endure 
painfully substandard service so that they may be able to purchase their items.77 
Other courts have endeavored to apply a broader understanding of § 1981 and its 
protections to the retail context.78 These courts recognize that the imposition of 
additional, discriminatory conditions into a purchase, such as requiring pre-payment or 
subjecting customers to discriminatory behavior during the time surrounding their 
purchase, whether before, during, or after, can interfere with the contractual rights 
protected by section 1981.79 
The latter line of decisions would appear to be in accord with section 1981’s 
legislative and interpretive history indicating that it was meant to be read broadly in order 
to combat “all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the 
Act.”80 Additionally, these cases give fuller meaning to the 1991 amendment’s expanded 
 
76 See discussion infra, s. III (A). 
77See generally Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black:  Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 To 
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003). 
78 See discussion infra, s. III (B). 
79 See discussion infra, s. III (B). 
80 Jones, 392 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). 
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definition of “make and enforce” contracts, which now expressly includes the “enjoyment 
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”81 
A. Courts Narrowly Interpreting Section 1981 
 Consumer discrimination cases that restrict causes of action under section 1981 to 
those in which the purchase was actually thwarted restrictively interpret the language of 
section 1981 and seemingly ignore the additional language of the 1991 amendment.82 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arguello v. Conoco is an illustrative example.83 The court 
in Arguello, citing section 1981, first stated that at issue in that case was “plaintiffs’ 
ability ‘to make and enforce contracts’ on nondiscriminatory terms.”84 The court decided 
because Ms. Arguello “successfully completed the transaction” and “received all she was 
entitled to under the retail-sales contract,” her claim must fail.85 The racial harassment 
she encountered before, during and after the moment in time when payment exchanged 
hands was not determined by this court to affect the benefits, terms, conditions or 
privileges of that transaction.  That “single, discrete transaction – the purchase of goods” 
was the starting and ending point of the court’s analysis.86 
81 42 U.S.C § 1981 (b) (2000). 
82 42  U.S.C. 1981 (b-c) (2000), excerpted supra at p.16. 
83 330 F.3d 355, 358-60 (5th Cir. 2003). 
84 Id. at 358 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
85 Id. at 359. 
86 Id. at 360. 
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 The Arguello court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit 
decision in Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, the Circuit’s first attempt to apply section 
1981 in the retail context.87 In Dillard, the plaintiff filed a section 1981 claim against 
Dillard Department Store after a security guard at the store followed her around while 
shopping and to her car after she left the store, where he took down her license plate 
number.88 The plaintiff then re-entered the store to confront the security guard about his 
actions.89 At that point, the security guard handcuffed the plaintiff, had a female officer 
search her, and then transported her to the police station where she was booked for 
shoplifting.90 After this incident, the plaintiff was banned from entering the store for a 
period of time.91 
The Fifth Circuit Dillard court first reviewed the elements of a prima facie case of 
§ 1981 discrimination that the Plaintiff Morris had to establish: “(1) that she is a member 
of a racial minority; (2) that Dillard’s had intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and 
(3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the 
statute, in this instance, the making and enforcement of a contract.”92 This three part test 
 
87 277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir. 2001). 
88 Id. at 746. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 747. 
91 Id. at 751. 
92 Id. (citing Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the cited 
three-part test first adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083 (5th 
Cir. 1994)). 
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was adopted in Fifth Circuit in 199493 and, at that time, had also been used in the Second 
Circuit and by a Florida district court.94 
In applying part three of this test, the court considered the plaintiff’s claim that 
the store’s decision to ban her shopping there for a specific period of time interfered with 
her § 1981 right to be free from discrimination in contracting.95 The court disagreed with 
the plaintiff and decided the ban did not interfere with her section 1981 rights.96 
The court stated that there was “no evidence in the record indicating that she made any 
tangible attempt . . . to enter any . . .  contractual agreement with Dillard’s, at any time during the 
course of the ban.”97 Therefore, her allegations of loss of contract rights were deemed “too 
speculative to establish loss of any actual contractual interest owed to her by Dillard’s.”98 The 
court concluded that “to raise a material issue of fact as to her § 1981 claim, Morris must offer 
evidence of some tangible attempt to contract with Dillard's during the course of the ban, which 
could give rise to a contractual duty between her and the merchant, and which was in some way 
thwarted.”99 
In reaching its conclusion that tangible efforts to contract must be actually thwarted by 
 
93 Green, 27 F.3d at 1086. 
94 Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1993), cited in 
Green, 27 F.3d at 1086; Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
95 Dillard, 277 F.3d at 752. 
96 Id. at 753. 
97 Id. at 752. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.
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the defendant in order to sustain a § 1981 claim, the Dillard court cited a series of decisions from 
its own and other circuits that support the proposition that loss of speculative contract interests 
do not interfere with § 1981 contract rights.100 The essence of this line of cases is that they 
require plaintiffs to establish “the loss of an actual, not speculative or prospective, contract 
interest.”101 These cases included the Seventh Circuit decision in Morris v. Office Max, Inc.,
which rejected a plaintiff's § 1981 claim asserting that a merchant interfered with his 
"prospective contractual relations" where the plaintiff had completed a purchase prior to being 
detained by police officers who suspected him of shoplifting, despite the fact that the plaintiff 
was examining additional goods with intent to purchase at the time he was detained.102 
The court also cited the Eighth Circuit’s Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., which 
found that where a plaintiff purchased some beef jerky and was then arrested for concealing 
other goods, the merchant "cannot be said to have deprived [the plaintiff] of any benefit of any 
contractual relationship, as no such relationship existed" at the time of the arrest because 
"nothing that happened after the sale created any further contractual duty on [the merchant's] 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 751-52 (citing Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 853-55 (8th Cir. 
2001); Hickerson v. Macy’s Dep’t Store at Esplanade Mall, No. CIV. A. 98-3170, 1999 WL 
144461, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 1999); Bellows, 118 F.3d at 275 (denying recover under § 1981 
to a plaintiff who failed to present any evidence that the defendant “did in fact interfere with the 
contract”); Morris v. Office Max, Inc.,  89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996); Phelps v. Wichita 
Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of a § 1981 claim 
where a plaintiff alleged “possible loss of future opportunities” to contract). 
102 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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part."103 The court also cited a Louisiana District Court decision, Hickerson v. Macy's Dep't 
Store at Esplanade Mall, where a plaintiff was not "prevented from making a particular 
purchase, or from returning [goods] he had previously bought" and thus the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of a merchant because "[t]here is no generalized right under section 
1981 to have access to opportunities to make prospective contracts.”104 
The Dillard court contrasted what it deemed “prospective” contractual interests with 
actual contractual interference by the merchant, which it deemed could properly give rise to a 
cognizable § 1981 claim.105 For example, the court cites the Sixth Circuit decision in Christian 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., which held that a plaintiff, who had gathered her intended purchases 
and was proceeding to check out when asked to leave the store, could bring a § 1981 for 
interference with her right to contract.106 Another example the court references is Henderson v. 
Jewel Food Stores, Inc., an Illinois district court case holding that "a § 1981 claim must allege 
that the plaintiff was actually prevented, and not merely deterred, from making a purchase or 
receiving service after attempting to do so," and finding a plaintiff's allegation sufficient to 
sustain a § 1981 claim where the "plaintiff was midstream in the process of making a contract for 
 
103 266 F.3d 851, 853-55 (8th Cir. 2001). 
104 No. CIV. A. 98-3170, 1999 WL 144461, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar.16, 1999). 
105 Dillard, 277 F.3d at 752.   
106 252 F.3d 862, 874 (6th Cir. 2001).  Interestingly, the Dillard court fails to mention the 
Christian court’s adoption of the “markedly hostile” prima facie test for § 1981 claims that 
would have allowed the plaintiff’s claim to proceed even if she had not been asked to leave the 
store while en route to purchase her items.  See id. at 872-73; see also discussion infra pp. 33-35. 
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[a] goods purchase" at a cashier at the time an officer arrested him.107 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arguello and the cases on which it relies 
illustrate these courts’ view that a section 1981 claim only lies where one physically 
attempts to contract with a merchant and is physically restrained from doing so, either by 
arrest or refusal to contract.  These courts have determined that contractual rights accrue 
only at the point money is exchanging hands, or when a customer is directly en route to 
the purchase point.  This narrow definition of § 1981’s “make and enforce contracts” 
language does not attempt to incorporate the 1991 amendment’s expanded definition of 
the phrase, which is now defined as “the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship,” into the retail context.108 
In fact, none of the above-referenced decisions seem to seriously consider 
Congress’s intent to broaden the protections of § 1981 with the 1991 Amendment.109 In 
Youngblood, for example, the court stated that Congress had amended § 1981 to “include 
the right to ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship,’” but then decided that after the purchase was completed, no 
contractual relationship remains.110 In Dillard, the court does not even reference the 1991 
 
107 No. 96 C 3666, 1996 WL 617165, at *3-4 (N.D.  Ill. Oct.23, 1996). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a-b) (2000). 
109 See generally Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 856-859 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
110 Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 854 (citing Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 372 
(D. Del. 1996) (holding that where plaintiff was detained and her bags searched after her 
purchase was completed, there was no contractual relationship remaining between her and the 
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amendment or its language regarding the contractual relationship in its application of § 
1981.111 In Morris v. Office Max, the court cites the language of the amended § 1981 (b), 
but then goes on to base its conclusion denying the § 1981 claim largely on pre-
amendment precedent.112 
These courts have failed to apply the broadened interpretation of § 1981, 
mandated by the 1991 amendment, to the retail contract.  They do not distinguish 
between the discrete retail transaction and the benefits, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
the contractual relationship.  The contract and the contractual relationship seem to appear 
to these courts as one in the same, an interpretation which would seem render the 
additional language of the 1991 amendment  - the entirety of section 1981 (b) - redundant 
and unnecessary. 
department store); Rogers v. Elliot, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding, 
similarly, that even though plaintiff was verbally and physically assaulted by an employee while 
in the store, because she had already paid for her purchases, there was no actionable § 1981 
claim)). 
111 Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751-52. 
112 Office Max, 89 F.3d at 413 (citing, as the basis for its decision, cases where customers were 
either refused service, Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. 
Cal.1988); Shen v. A & P Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184(FB), 1995 WL 728416 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 
21, 1995); removed from the store, Flowers v. The TJX Companies, No. 91-CV-1339, 1994 WL 
382515 (N.D. N.Y. July 15, 1994); or for a store practice of recording the race of all customers 
paying by check, Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Mo.1991).   
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As courts wrestle with the applicability of § 1981 to the retail context, they should 
re-examine what is, in fact, a contractual “relationship” in the retail setting, based on § 
1981’s legislative and interpretive history, the intent of the 1991 amendment, and general 
principles of contract law.  These sources indicate that the conclusion is likely that the 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a retail contract include a variety of 
activities and cover a broader frame of time than a simple, momentary, exchange of 
consideration.  Retail shoppers enter stores, browse around, examine items, perhaps ask 
employees for assistance, and finally proceed to pay for their items.  Even after the 
purchase is complete, the customer often has the option to return or exchange the items, 
and thus the contractual relationship continues.  Each step in this shopping experience 
affects the final outcome:  if, what, and how much the customer will purchase.  It is also 
during these pre-purchase activities that most discrimination is suffered.113 The entirety 
of the retail experience deserves analysis and consideration in determining the parameters 
of the retail contractual relationship -- its terms, privileges, conditions, and benefits.  The 
decisions discussed below illustrate a growing recognition of this expanded view of the 
contractual relationship in the retail setting. 
 
B.  Moving Toward an Expanded Vision of Section 1981 
Protections in the Commercial Context 
 
A broader interpretation of § 1981’s applicability to the retail context has been 
incorporated into the reasoning of several district courts in North Carolina, Kansas, New 
 
113 See Harris, supra note 77. 
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York, Illinois, and Ohio, and by the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals.114 Unlike 
the cases reviewed above, these courts do not require a denial of the right to contract in 
order to invoke § 1981.  Instead, they examine the facts to determine whether the terms of 
the contractual relationship change with the race of the customer.  For example, a Kansas 
district court applied the same prima facie standard as used in the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits,115 but found that plaintiffs may state a claim of 1981 discrimination by showing 
that their “contractual relationship” was burdened with additional conditions or treatment 
that were not applied to dealings with white customers.116 
The analysis, and the applicability of § 1981, in the cases below hinges on 
whether the discriminatory treatment of the minority customers is determined to change 
 
114 See e.g. Christian v. Wal-Mart, 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001) ; Hall v. Pennsylvania State 
Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978); Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ohio 2002); 
Kelly v. Bank Midwest, 161 F. Supp.2d 1248 (D. Kan. 2001); Joseph v. New York Yankees 
Partnership, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000); Hill v. Shell 
Oil Company, 78 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Bobbitt v. Rage, 19 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. 
N.C. 1998). 
115 See Kelly v. Bank Midwest, 161 F. Supp.2d 1248, 1255-57 (D. Kan. 2001) (employing the 
prima facie test used in the Tenth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits:  1) the plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class, 2) the defendant had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, and 3) the 
discrimination interfered with a protected activity as defined in § 1981);  see also Bellows, 118
F.3d at 274 (employing the same prima facie test);  Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 
(7th Cir.1996) (applying the test to a retail transaction). 
116 Kelly, 161 F. Supp.2d at 1255-57.  
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the terms and/or conditions of their contract with the commercial establishment.  These 
courts are stepping beyond the moment when consideration is exchanged in an attempt to 
explore and define the parameters of the retail contract, and, in doing so, are paying 
special attention to the additional language of the 1991 amendment, which requires 
freedom from discrimination in contracting to include the “enjoyment of all benefits, 
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”117 The courts 
particularly focus on the “terms and conditions” of the relationship, and whether the 
discriminatory treatment can be said to have altered these terms and conditions. 
Some of the first cases to step in this direction arose within the context of a 
restaurant service contract.  For example, in Bobbitt v. Rage, the Western District of 
North Carolina court held that the African-American plaintiffs had established a prima 
facie section 1981 claim because although they were eventually served by the defendants’ 
restaurant, they, unlike the white customers eating there, were required to prepay for their 
food.118 The court found that the prepay requirement altered “an essential term of the 
customer/restaurateur contract because of race.”119 Consequently, the court found the 
defendant had denied the plaintiffs of the “enjoyment of all . . . terms and conditions of 
the contractual relationship” that were enjoyed by white customers.120 That the plaintiffs 
had eventually been served did not change the court’s analysis.121 
117 42 U.S.C § 1981 (b) (2000). 
118 Bobbitt, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 518-19. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
121 See id. 
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 Additionally, a district court in New York found that when an African-American 
woman was required to change clothes before entering a restaurant, when other white 
patrons who were wearing similar or identical apparel were not asked to change, her 
section 1981 contract rights were violated despite the fact that she ultimately received 
service and completed her contract.122 That court clarified, “[I]mposing an additional 
condition upon minority customers that is not imposed upon non-minorities states a 
section 1981 claim for discrimination concerning the making and enforcing of contracts.  
Where additional conditions are placed on minorities entering the contractual 
relationship, those minorities have been denied the right to contract on the same terms 
and conditions as is enjoyed by white citizens.”123 
This reasoning is equally applicable in the retail context.  In Hill v. Shell Oil 
Company, for example, the Northern District of Illinois court held that requiring black 
customers to prepay for their gas inserted an additional, discriminatory term in their retail 
contract and therefore “directly implicat[ed] plaintiffs’ right to contract and to enjoy ‘all 
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.’” 124 The court 
rejected the defendant’s assertion that because the contracts were completed that § 1981 
did not apply.125 The court held that because the terms of the plaintiffs’ purchase were 
different from those of white customers – the black plaintiffs were required to pre-pay 
 
122 Joseph v. New York Yankees Partnership, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000). 
123 Id. at *4. 
124 78 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).   
125 Id. at 777-78.   
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while white customers could pay after pumping their gas – that they sufficiently stated a 
§ 1981 claim.126 
The plaintiffs in Bobbitt, Joseph, and Hill were required to submit to conditions 
not imposed on white customers in order to complete their contracts.  The courts found, 
even though the contract was not prevented, the additional conditions changed the terms 
of their contracts on the basis of race, and therefore violated § 1981. These courts stepped 
beyond an understanding of the commercial contract as an instantaneous exchange of 
consideration, toward a realization that the consumer contract has terms and conditions 
like any other contract.  The terms and conditions identified by these courts included the 
time of payment and requirements for entering the premises.  When commercial 
establishments changed these conditions on the basis of race, then § 1981 rights were 
transgressed.   
The question remained, however, as to when discriminatory treatment, as opposed 
to altered terms, impacted the conditions of the contractual relationship described in § 
1981.  In Ms. Arguello’s case, for example, could the verbal assault she underwent 
change the conditions or terms of her contractual relationship with the gas station?127 
The following cases illustrate that discriminatory treatment can, indeed, impact the 
conditions of the contractual relationship, and that the language of § 1981 clearly protects 
minority customers from such discriminatory behavior. 
 
126 Id. at 777. 
127 Arguello, 2001 WL 1442340, at *1. 
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 One case that began to blur the line between discriminatory treatment and 
discriminatory terms was Kelly v. Bank Midwest.128 In Kelly, the Kansas district court 
reviewed the holdings in Bobbitt, Joseph, and Hill, and held that a bank customer who 
was subjected to discriminatory treatment during the application for a loan stated a prima 
facie case of § 1981 discrimination, despite the fact that the loan was eventually 
granted.129 The plaintiff’s check was investigated to determine whether it was stolen; an 
agent of the bank drove by the property identified on the plaintiff’s application to assess 
the representation of it on the application; and the bank called the police for “assistance” 
upon learning of what it considered suspicious information in the plaintiff’s 
background.130 
The court applied the reasoning of Bobbitt, Washington, and Joseph to determine 
that the treatment of the plaintiff imposed additional terms and conditions on his contract 
that were “less favorable than those enjoyed by white customers.”131 The court found the 
bank’s alteration of these conditions was “the essence of a section 1981 claim” and 
therefore denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment.132 Important in this analysis 
is that the court identified as discriminatory the treatment of the plaintiff’s application, 
rather than additional actions that the plaintiff might have been required to perform.  This 
treatment was the basis for the court’s affirmation of the § 1981 claim. 
 
128 161 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Kan. 2001). 
129 Id. at 1257-58. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1258. 
132 Id.  
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 The recognition that discriminatory treatment can implicate the terms and 
conditions of a contractual relationship and trigger § 1981 protections is not necessarily a 
recent development.  As long ago as 1978, long before the broadening language of the 
1991 Civil Rights Act was added to section 1981, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that that a section 1981 claim lay in the implementation of a discriminatory picture-taking 
policy in a bank.133 The bank, at the direction of the state police, had begun to 
photograph all “suspicious black males or females” who entered the bank.134 The Court 
of Appeals found that even though the plaintiff, a black male customer, was not 
prevented from completing his transaction, because he was photographed during it his 
section 1981 rights were implicated.135 The Court stated “Section 1981 obligates 
commercial enterprises to extend the same treatment to contractual customers as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.”136 
In 1990, also prior to the amended version of § 1981, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals similarly found, in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, “the fact that the 
[plaintiffs] were never refused service in this case is not controlling.”137 This case 
involved discrimination against African-American plaintiffs by a private social club 
conducting a social gathering open to all invited guests.138 Even applying the restrictive 
 
133 Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1978). 
134 Id. at 88. 
135 Id. at 92. 
136 Id. (emphasis added). 
137 915 F.2d 235, 243 (6th Cir. 1990). 
138 Id. at 238. 
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definition of “make and enforce” contracts promulgated by Patterson, the court found 
that because at least one of the plaintiffs was asked to leave the premises, rather than 
being refused service, they were denied “’the same right to make contracts . . .  as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.’”139 The plaintiffs were not forced to leave, nor was there an 
outright refusal to contract.  Nevertheless, the court found that the conduct of the 
employees toward the plaintiffs effectively prevented them from contracting, and 
therefore section 1981 contract rights were violated.140 
The Hall, Watson, and Kelly courts found that that actual physical prevention of 
the contract should not be required in order to state a § 1981 claim, and nor should the 
imposition of additional affirmative requirements (such as the pre-pay requirement) be 
essential to a finding of discriminatory conditions – discriminatory treatment can suffice.  
This expanded understanding of § 1981’s protections was adopted by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2001.  In Christian v. Wal-Mart, the Court of Appeals announced a 
new prima facie test of a § 1981 claim.141 The plaintiff, under the Christian rule, must 
establish 1) that s/he is a member of a protected class; 2) that s/he “sought to make or 
enforce a contract for services ordinarily provided by the defendant”; and 3) that s/he was 
“denied the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits or privileges of the contractual 
 
139 Id. at 243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981).   
140 Id. 
141 Christian v. Wal-Mart, 252 F.3d 862, 868-69, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the four-part 
test used in the Second and Fifth Circuits and adopting that introduced in Callwood v. Dave and 
Busters, 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (D. Md. 2000) (applying the prima facie test to a claim of racial 
discrimination arising in the restaurant context). 
Abby Morrow Richardson   - Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination 
 
36
relationship” by either a) she was “deprived of services while similarly situated persons 
outside the protected class were not” and/or b) “she received services in a markedly 
hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively 
discriminatory.”142 Thus, part 3(b) of this test explicitly recognizes that discriminatory 
treatment can alter the terms, conditions, and privileges of the contractual relationship 
protected by § 1981.  This test moves the legal standard toward a truer application of the 
intent of both the original § 1981 and its 1991 amendment. 
 “Racial animus can offend a customer equally whether he gets no service at all or 
is served in a manner that marks him with the badge of slavery that the Civil Rights Acts 
were enacted to remove.”143 So stated a Sixth Circuit district court in Leach v. Heyman,
applying the “markedly hostile” standard set forth in Christian v. Wal-Mart.144 The facts 
in Leach closely mirrored those of Arguello.145 The plaintiff, an African-American 
customer in a convenience store, brought his items to the counter and asked the retail 
clerk for a pack of cigarettes.146 After a terse exchange of remarks during which the 
plaintiff completed his purchase, the clerk began to should at him racial epithets.147 The 
clerk then proceeded to jump over the counter and assault him.148 Although the plaintiff, 
 
142 Id. at 872. 
143 Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
144 Id.; see also Christian, 252 F.3d 862. 
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just like Ms. Arguello, was able to complete his purchase, he was subjected to harassment 
and conditions not imposed on the other non-minority customers in the store.149 The 
court concluded that a jury could find that the clerk’s “treatment of plaintiff was 
continuous, and manifested animus during the entire period that he was in the store,” and 
therefore satisfied the elements of the prima facie case. 150 
This result stands in stark contrast to the decisions in the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits which have stated both that any contractual relationship that once may have 
existed ceases to exist after the purchase is complete, and that any discriminatory 
treatment that does not prevent the purchase does not affect the contractual 
relationship.151 This court found not only that the actions of the clerk after the purchase 
was completed constituted illegal section 1981 discrimination, but also seems to imply 
that the obvious animus affected this contractual relationship from the moment he entered 
the store.152 
The courts that restrictively read the scope of section 1981 to the exclusion of 
both pre- and post- contract formation conduct in the retail setting were wary of creating 
causes of action that are based on prospective contract interests.153 In Leach, however, 
 
149 Id. (In the store at the same time was the plaintiff’s white companion.) 
150 Id. at 910. 
151 See, e.g., Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 358-60 (5th Cir. 2003); Morris v. Office Max, 
Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996). 
152 Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 910.   
153 See e.g. Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751-52 (requiring loss of “actual” contract interests, not those 
that are “speculative” or “prospective); see also discussion supra s. III(A). 
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the court carefully explained that not all instances of poor, slow, or substandard service 
would support a section 1981 claim.154 By carefully observing the requirements of the 
“markedly hostile” standard, courts can guard against opening the floodgates to an influx 
of illegitimate racial discrimination claims invoking section 1981.  The standard requires 
that, in order to state a claim, a customer must either be denied services or receive 
“services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would 
find objectively discriminatory.”155 The objective standard weeds out behavior that does 
not rise to a sufficient level to infer a discriminatory intent.   
The standard also creates a flexibility that will necessarily adapt to different 
commercial settings:  the “services” one receives in a department store will differ from 
those of a gas station.  This adaptability moves toward a more generalized conception of 
what the “contractual relationship” means in a commercial retail setting – it is one where 
services are offered and tendered; not one where the entirety of the contract begins and 
ends at the instant consideration changes hands. This conception of the retail contract 
better incorporates the amended language of section 1981(b)’s definition of “make and 
enforce contracts,” and offers a judicial remedy for victims of discrimination envisioned 
 
154 Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11.  The court compares its facts to those in several restaurant-
industry cases, where although the plaintiffs received rude, slow, or substandard service, the 
service was not indicative of racial animus and therefore no § 1981 claim was stated:  Lizardo v. 
Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2001); Callwood v. Dave and Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 
694, 706 (D. Md. 2000); Bobbitt by Bobbitt v. Rage, 19 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (W.D.N.C. 1998); 
and Robertson v. Burger King, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. La. 1994). 
155 Leach, 233 F. Supp. at 909. 
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by the 1866 Civil Rights Act – one that “prohibit[s] all racially motivated deprivations of 
those rights enumerated in the statute . . . ;”156 as well as one that protects the “personal 
right to engage in economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory 
interference.”157 
IV. Some Interpretive Guidance from Common Law Contract Theory  
Section 1981 is a provision that governs contractual relations.  As courts struggle 
with how broadly or narrowly to apply its prohibition against racial discrimination in 
retail contracting, guidance can be found not only in the statute’s legislative and 
interpretive history, but also in the evolving common law of contracts.  Section 1981 
references the ability to “make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”158 It does not create a new federal contract right for minorities, rather it seeks 
to level the contractual playing field; it aims to eliminate racial discrimination in the 
contracting process, so that minorities and whites may contract on the same terms.159 
Therefore, a look at the law that defines those terms is helpful.160 
156 Jones, 392 U.S. 409. 
157 Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661. 
 
158 42 U.S.C. 1981 (b) (2000).  
159 See Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance:  Patterson and a State 
Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 446 (1990).   
160 See id. 
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Classical contract theory, which emerged in the nineteenth century, was grounded 
in the ideology of the freedom of contract.161 The ideals associated with freedom of 
contract include an exaltation of laissez-faire capitalism, individual autonomy, and 
freedom from state interference with economic activities.162 Each actor in a contractual 
relationship dealt at her own risk:  the bargaining, the agreement, and the duties and 
consequences flowing therefrom were solely up to the parties.  The terms of the contract 
were only those explicitly defined within its four corners.  Courts did not inquire into the 
adequacy of consideration or the fairness of the bargain struck, and the parties therefore 
were bound only by the law and terms of their contract.163 As a result, as Professor Ira 
Nerken remarked in 1977, consumers were not protected from “harmful merchandise, 
employees from harm, travelers from collision, or blacks from abject discrimination.  The 
law was too busy protecting the private actor to protect private individual victims from 
 
161 See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 6 (1974); Comment: The Many Theories of 
Contract, in Edward J. Murphy & Richard E. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law 88-89 (4th ed. 
1991). 
162 Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1012 
(1985).  See also discussion in Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper 
Considerations:  A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the 
Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 191 (Jan. 1994). 
163 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 1.1, at 4 (1990). 
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the antisocial byproducts of the actor’s activity.  The law was too busy limiting social 
duty to account for social costs.”164 
As contract and social theory evolved, recognition of social duty and societal 
interdependence crept into the jurisprudence of contracts.165 The modern neoclassical 
contract model imports community standards of decency and fairness into contractual 
obligations.166 These obligations insert themselves as implied terms of any contract.  
While the freedom to contract still exists, it now exists within certain legal and moral 
boundaries.167 Examples of some of the many common law contract developments that 
form these boundaries include the doctrines of promissory estoppel, the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and the duty to serve.168 
Promissory estoppel is an illustrative example of how contract theory has evolved 
from a strict interpretation of the agreed-upon terms of the contract to one that 
encompasses moral and social norms of what is just and fair.  Promissory estoppel is 
defined in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “A promise which the 
 
164 Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the 
Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
297, 332 (1977), quoted in Williams, supra note 162, at 194.   
165 Williams, supra note 162, at 194.   
166 Id. 
167 Burton, supra note 159, at 447-48.   
168 See Burton, supra note 159; Williams, supra note 162.  Other relevant developments include 
the recognition of unilateral mistake, unconscionability, and the lawful performance doctrine. 
Burton, supra note 159, at 448-49. 
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promisor should expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a 
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”169 The foundation of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is that community norms require that an individual be held 
responsible for the foreseeable harm to another caused by her conduct.170 The theory of 
promissory estoppel imports equitable estoppel, tort, and agency doctrines of personal 
responsibility for misrepresentations that induce reliance and/or cause harm to another.171 
Whereas classical contract theory emphasized consideration as the hallmark of the 
contract – the bargained-for exchange, promissory estoppel allows a contract and its term 
to be implied from the circumstances, without a meeting of the minds and with no 
delineated terms for which consideration is offered and accepted.172 Some have called 
the promissory estoppel theory that of a “quasi-contract,” a “contract implied in law,” or 
even “a legal fiction necessary to promote the ends of justice.”173 Nevertheless, 
promissory estoppel has become widely accepted as a basic tenet of modern contract 
law.174 
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1) (1981). 
170 Williams, supra note 162, at 195 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH. FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS, 2.19, at 146-47 (1990)). 
171 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1), cmt. (1981). 
172 Gilmore, supra note 161, at 76. 
173 Id. at 73-74. 
174 Williams, supra note 162, at 195 (citing Farnsworth, supra note 163). 
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The duty of good faith and fair dealing is another tenet of modern contract law 
which imports implicit terms and conditions into a contract. Although classical contract 
theory was loathe to recognize a generalized duty to act in good faith,175 good faith in 
contracting is now required by the Uniform Commercial Code,176 the Restatement of 
Contracts,177 and a majority of the states.178 The Second Restatement of Contracts states 
in section 205:  “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”179 Although good faith is not 
specifically defined by the Restatement, the Comments to section 205 indicate that it is 
generally a prohibition against bad-faith behavior, as defined by community standards of 
fairness and decency.180 Good faith requires adherence to an agreed common purpose, 
 
175 Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith:  Good-Faith Disclosure in 
Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 384 (1978).  See also Robert S. Adler and Richard 
A. Mann, Good Faith:  A New Look at an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REV. 31, 42 (1994). 
176 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992). 
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). 
178 Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 & n.1 (1980). 
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). 
180 Id. at cmt. a. See also Williams, supra note 162, at 206;  Adler and Mann, supra note 175, at 
44;  Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 262 (1968). 
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consistency with the justified expectations of the other party,181 and according to the 
UCC, “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”182 Therefore, the 
expectations of the parties that the other will act in good faith are protected by contract 
law, even though this term is not written explicitly into their contract. 
The duty to serve doctrine is yet another tenet of contract law that places 
obligations on the contracting parties that may not be written into the four corners of the 
contract.183 The duty to serve doctrine is not in itself a recent jurisprudential 
development.  Its origins date back to the fifteenth century, when English business, 
whether by holding a monopoly on a particular service or by holding itself as open to the 
general public, such as a common carrier or inn, was required by contract law to serve all 
unless a reasonable reason existed not to do so.184 
The duty to serve doctrine in early American jurisprudence was implemented 
through an analysis of whether the business in question was one considered “public.”185 
These included innkeepers and common carriers such as railroads; restaurants, racetracks, 
and places of amusement were considered private and not bound by the duty to serve.186 
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).  See also discussion in Adler and 
Mann, supra note 175, at 43-44. 
182 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1992).   
183 See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993, 
1995-96 (1989). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 96. 
186Id. 
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Although essentially contrary to the revered concept of freedom of contract and, 
therefore, the freedom to choose with whom one contracted, even in classical contract 
theory there existed this obligation on certain service providers not to discriminate in the 
terms or treatment of their customers.187 Recent American interpretations of the duty to 
serve has expanded its reach to businesses that were once considered private, including 
restaurants, gas stations, hospitals and home builders.188 Generally, the analysis focuses 
on the extent to which the business holds itself out to serve the general public.189 This 
expansion is consistent with the general evolution of contract law to impose obligations 
of good faith, fair dealing, and faithfulness to justified expectations of the contracting 
parties, discussed above. 
The doctrines of promissory estoppel, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and 
the duty to serve illustrate the common law’s recognition of the totality of the contractual 
relationship.  The contract is not formed in a vacuum of social and moral obligation or 
responsibility, and it does not consist of split-second moment in time when consideration 
changes hands, even in the retail setting.  Standards of morality, fairness, and decency are 
always terms of the contract and are required for the duration of the contracting process.  
Businesses open to the public often have pre-contract formation duties to their customers 
not to discriminate against them.  Contractual terms now incorporate many obligations 
that may not be delineated in their language.   
 
187 See id. 
188 Id. at 1997-98. 
189 Id. at 1998-99. 
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It is troubling, therefore, that in light of the common law’s ever-expanding 
definition of what a contract is and what its terms and responsibilities include, that many 
federal courts would retreat to a narrow, restrictive reading of the civil rights statute that 
governs contractual relationships.  Ironically, common law’s almost mythic attachment to 
the classical conception of the bargained-for contract is declining.  The four corners of a 
contract are dissolving as the duties and obligations of contracting parties become more 
fluid, subjective, and dependent on context, norms, and ideals of social responsibility.   
At the same, statutory civil rights protections, whose primary purpose is ostensibly to 
eradicate all forms discrimination in the economic sphere, are being applied by some 
courts using an extremely restrictive, narrow, and regressive definition of both the 
contract and the contractual relationship surrounding it.  Courts interpreting section 1981 
in the retail context should follow the common law’s lead and recognize that no longer 
can contracts or their obligations be so simply defined, particularly when the result is to 
leave statutory rights without protection. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of  
contracts.  The 1991 amendment to section 1981 clarified that the right to make and 
enforce contracts includes making, performance, modification, and termination of 
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship.190 In a retail setting, the interpretation of section 1981 
protections should necessarily allow causes of actions when customers have been 
 
190 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) (2000). 
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harassed, followed, verbally abused, or otherwise treated in a “markedly hostile” manner, 
as well as when they refused or deprived of service.  The legislative intent of section 
1981, its various interpretations and applications by the Supreme Court, and the common 
law evolution of contract theory itself all instruct that section 1981 should be broadly 
construed so as to both deter and remedy consumer racial discrimination.  The 
discrepancies in the federal courts’ application of § 1981 to the consumer retail contract 
should be eradicated and a uniform, broad standard, such as the Sixth Circuit’s “markedly 
hostile” test, should be adopted. Only then will the purpose of the § 1981 be fully 
realized. 
